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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Yutaka Nakamurat
Abstract: Many current legal issues pertaining to copyright of computer software
involve defining the scope of protection of non-literal expression, such as "user inter-
face" and "look and feel," in contrast to literal expression, such as "source code," to
which ownership may be more clearly attributed. Superficially, it appears that the case
law pertaining to non-literal expression is developing differently in Japan and the United
States. This comment demonstrates that, however, while Japanese and U.S. courts have
been applying formally different analytical criteria, the decisions of both have been
similar in seeking equity-oriented solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of copyright protection for computer software has
recently entered a "second generation."l When the issue of legal protection
for computer software first arose in the 1970s and early 1980s, the
discussion centered on whether computer software was protected under
copyright. In the United States and Japan, this "first generation" issue was
solved by judicial decisions which recognized that literal aspects of
computer software, which include the machine-readable "object code" and
the programmer-readable "source code," were protected as "literary work"
under copyright laws.2 These holdings were later codified by amendments
to the Copyright Act of each country.
In the context of rapid developments in computer technology and
computer software markets, the center of the discussion has now shifted to a
t B.L., 1986 Kyiishii University; LL.M., 1992 University of Washington.
This article is based on the author's paper presented at the LL.M. Asian Law Program at the
University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to thank Toshiko Takenaka, Assistant
Director, Center for Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual Property; Michael Townsend, Assistant
Professor of the University of Washington School of Law; and David Lowe and Carl Marquardt for
comments on an early draft. The author also owes thanks to Naoid Koizuni, Assistant Professor of Kobe
University, and Takehiko Ando for invaluable information on Japanese materials. The author is solely
responsible for the shortcomings of this work.
I See generally Edward Samuels, 'The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law," 56 TENN. L.
REv. 321, 355-366 (1989) for a categorization of the developments of computer software cases. See also
Menell, "An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs," 41 STAN. L. REV.
1045, 1048 (1989).
2 17 U.S.C.S. § 101 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
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"second generation" issue: to what extent non-literal aspects of computer
software are protected under copyright.3 The protectable elements at issue
include "structure, sequence, and organization" ("SSO"), "look and feel,"
"user interface,"4 and other visual aspects generated by computer software.
At first glance, developments in case law in the U.S. and Japan
indicate substantial differences between the two countries. The U.S. courts
have relied on common law copyright doctrines, while the Japanese courts
have depended on the statutory requirements of copyright. Most noticeably,
the U.S. courts have gradually broadened the scope of protection to include
non-literal aspects by application of the idea-expression doctrine; the
Japanese courts, on the other hand, have yet to recognize non-literal aspects
as protectable. 5 This difference is said to be mainly derived from a unique
statutory provision of the Japanese Copyright Act which expressly excludes
"algorithms" from copyright protection. 6 This view, in conjunction with the
conservativeness of the Japanese courts in developing the law, appears to
imply that there is little room for the Japanese courts to go beyond the
current limited protection as long as the statutory exclusion exists.7
3 See CRAIG JoICE, sr AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 137 (2d ed. 1991) ["The 'second generation' software
cases are concerned with thrashing out which elements of protected computer programs should benefit
from protection, and to what extent" (emphasis original)]. One commentator divides the developments into
three "waves": the first wave which dealt with protection for literal codes of computer software, the second
wave with "structure, sequence and organization," and the third wave with user interface issues. David
Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai: Rationality Prevails, 9 COMPTUER LAW. 1 (Aug. 1992).
4 There is an uncertainty in the definitions of "look and feel" and "user interface." "Look and feel" is
generally defined as "a set of functional capabilities of a programmed computer and the way it 'interacts'
with a user." Steven Lundberg, et al., The Copyright/Patent Interface: Why Utilitarian "Look and Feel" is
Uncopyrightable Subject Matter, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 5 (Jan. 1989). Likewise, "user interface" generally
refers to "all of the devices by which the human user can interact with the computer in order to accomplish
the tasks of the computer program." Joseph T. Verdesca, Copyrighting the User Interface: Too Much
Protection?, 45 Sw. LJ. 1047, 1047 n.4 (1991).
Some commentators and courts have used the "user interface" and "look and feel" of computer soft-
ware interchangeably. See, e.g., Alan S. Middleton, A Thousand Clones: The Scope of Copyright
Protection in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Programs, 63 WASH. L. REV. 195, 195 & n.2 (1988); Lotus
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International, 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D.Mass. 1990). But one
commentator states that the majority of scholars differentiate between "look and feel" and "user interface,"
understanding that "user interface" is one element of "look and feel." Brian Johnson, An Analysis of the
Copyrightability of the "Look and Feel" of a Computer Program: Lotus v. Paperback Software, 52 OHIO
ST. LJ. 947, 953-61 (1991).
5 For discussion of "literal similarity and non-fragmented comprehensive similarity," see MELVILLE
B. NIMMNER AND DAvID NIMtR, 3 NmMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[A] (1988) [hereinafter NIMMER]. See
also M. LEAFrER, UNDESTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.5. at 269 (1989).
6 See, e.g., Dennis S. Kaijala, Copyright Protection of Computer SofAvare in the United States and
Japan: Part 11, 7 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 231 (1991).
7 See, e.g., Rovert R. Devdza, Legal Protection of Computer Software in Major Industrial Countries:
A Survey of Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Software, 9 PAC. BASIN LJ. 166, 179 (1991).
Karjala, Japanese Courts Interpret the "Algorithm" Limitation on the Copyright Protection of Computer
Programs, 31 JuRIMERICs J. 233, 234 (1991).
VOL. 2 No. 2
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
This article reviews the recent "second generation" case law in the
United States and Japan, with attention to the factual patterns as well as de-
velopment of legal tests. With this emphasis, the article attempts to demon-
strate that superficial differences in the scope of protection under the U.S.
and the Japanese case law are a reflection of the different fact-patterns
which the U.S. and Japanese courts have faced. This article also
demonstrates that the apparent difference in the legal tests applied to
determine copyrightability is merely a matter of legal formality; that in fact,
the U.S. and Japanese courts have adopted virtually identical processes of
analysis with respect to second generation issues.
II. U.S. LAW
A. Background
1. Legislative History of the Copyright Act
The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790, pursuant to the constitu-
tional authority of the Congress "to Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 8 As significant
changes in technology occurred, the list of copyrightable work under the Act
was gradually broadened by amendments. Consequently, the 1976
Copyright Act defined copyrightable works as "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression" and expressly included literary,
musical, dramatic, pantomime, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural,
audiovisual, and architectural works and sound recordings. 9
Although the 1976 Act did not explicitly refer to computer software,
it was deemed to fall within the category of "literary works."10 Recognizing
the necessity for special consideration of the problems surrounding the
8 U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 8.
9 The Copyright Act section 102(a). The U.S. Copyright Office had already accepted approximately
two thousand copyright registrations of computer software as "books" before the 1976 Act on the condition
that it was published and contained sufficient original authorship, and submitted to the Office in human-
readable form. See Samuels, supra note 1, at 356 n.156. See also Devdza, supra note 7, at 180.
10 See Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983). The court
examined the legislative history of the section 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, holding that object code
of computer programs is protected as literary work. See also HR. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary works'.. . includes computer data bases
and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of the
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.").
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copyright law and computer software, Congress created The National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)
to address the problem. In 1979, CONTU recommended that a definition of
"computer program" be included in the Copyright Act. In 1980, Congress
adopted the recommendation, defining "computer program" in section 101
as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result."
2. The Idea-Expression Doctrine and the Related Concepts
Under the Copyright Act, computer software is subject to the limita-
tions of protection that commonly apply to all kinds of copyrightable works.
The most important rule developed by courts to limit the scope of the copy-
right protection is the idea-expression doctrine, which holds that copyright
protection extends only to the "expression" of an idea and never to the
"idea" itself. This doctrine is embodied in section 102(b) of the 1976 Act:
"[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery."' 1
This rule was first established in Baker v. Selden,12 in which the court
denied copyright protection for the plaintiffs book-keeping system on the
ground that to give an exclusive right to the underlying idea itself would
allow for a monopoly on ideas which should properly belong in the public
domain. The court further stated:
[W]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given
therewith to the public. 13
11 The legislative history refers to the distinction between ideas and expressions in terms of com-
puter software: "Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend
protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the "writing"
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law." Id. at 5670.
In Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1990), the court de-
scribed the purpose of section 102(b) as "[i]n drawing this fundamental distinction, Congress balanced the
competing concerns of providing incentive to authors to create and of fostering competition in such crea-
tivity 
.... "
12 101 U.S. 99,25 L. Ed. 841 (1879).
13 Id. at 103.
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This part of the court's opinion represents the concept known as the
merger doctrine. That is, where only one or a limited number of ways of
expression exist, the expression itself is not copyrightable. The rationale for
this rule is that if such expressions were copyrightable, no one could express
the underlying idea without infringing on the copyright. This would allow
the copyright owner a monopoly on ideas without the limitations imposed
by patent law.14 The merger doctrine thus gives greater force to the idea-ex-
pression doctrine. 15
Like the merger doctrine, the scenes a faire doctrine represents an
aspect of the idea-expression dichotomy. Under the scenes afaire doctrine,
an expression that is indispensable or natural to an idea in works dealing
with similar subjects is not copyrightable. 16  Although this concept
originally derived from the non-copyrightability of stock characters and
features of dramatic works, it is now applied to standard or common
expressions or features in a variety of works. 17
Since computer software is typically utilitarian, these doctrines which
restrict utilitarian ideas from copyright protection play an important role in
determining the scope of protection for computer software.18 As the U.S.
cases discussed below indicate, however, these doctrines have not always
provided clear guidelines for courts to distinguish between protectable and
unprotectable elements of works at issue. Since these doctrines are stated in
quite general terms, they are inevitably difficult to apply in a predictable
manner. 19 U.S. case law developments are, in a way, the consequence of the
courts' struggle to use these doctrines to establish the appropriate line be-
tween protectable and unprotectable elements of a given work.
14 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpaldan, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971): "When the
'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since protecting
the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free
of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law."
15 See Kem River, 899 F.2d at 1463: "The doctrine of 'merger' developed in an effort to deal with
this difficulty in locating the precise boundary between idea and expression. The doctrine holds that when
the expression of an idea is inseparable from the idea itself, the expression and idea merge."
r
6 See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("[Slcenes a faire refers to 'incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter in-
dispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.' (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F.
Supp. 40,45), Such stock literary devices are not protectible by copyright."). See also Data East USA, Inc.
v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Nor can copyright protection be afforded to elements of
expression that necessary... to 'scenes a faire'.").
17 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D.Cal. 1992).
18 See Menell, supra note 1, at 1103.
19 See Samuels, supra note 1, at 324.
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B. The Development of Legal Tests
1. Early SSO Cases
Early attempts to establish the copyrightability of non-literal software
elements resulted in conflict and discord. The conflicting understanding of
U.S. courts is well represented by two early software cases; Synercom
Technology Inc. v. University Computing Company20  and Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.21
In Synercom, the court denied copyright protection for the SSO of an
input format on the ground that they constituted unprotectable ideas. The
Synercom court concluded that the input format is not an expression separa-
ble from the underlying idea, using the analogy of automobile's "H" pattern
stick shift.22 The court reasoned that while copyright protected any mode of
expression of the H-pattern, such as a manual, diagram, or photograph, an-
other manufacturer should not be prevented from applying the H-pattern
itself in designing a car.23 This conclusion reflects the policy consideration
that such structures or patterns should properly belong to the public
domain.24 Given the conflicting interests between the copyright owner and
a competing newcomer in a computer software market, the Synercom court
opted for a rule enhancing the dissemination of valuable ideas. As a result,
the Synercom court interpreted the idea-expression distinction to allow little
protection for non-literal program elements.
In Whelan the court put forth completely different considerations in
holding that the SSO of a dental laboratory record keeping program were
copyrightable. 25 The central issue for the Whelan court was whether it
could find infringement based upon the substantial similarity in the SSO of
the software, even though the two programs were not identical in terms of
literal codes. The court considered the idea-expression distinction as
declared in Baker v. Selden, and stated that "the purpose or function of a
utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not
20 462 F.Supp 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
21 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986).
22 Synercom at 1013.
23 Id.
24 Id
25 Prior to the Whelan decision, the court in SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) found copyright infringement based on the similarity in the structure of two
programs. In SAS, while the court did not articulate the structure of the plaintiffs program, one can also
find a strong equity factor in that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs source code in developing the
program in violation of a license agreement between the parties.
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necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea."26 Applying this rule, the court found that the idea of the plaintiffs
program was "to aid in the business operations of a dental laboratory."27
The SSO of the program fell within the "everything else" and was therefore
copyrightable expression.28 In so holding, the Whelan court rejected the
Synercom holding that the line between literal and non-literal elements was
the appropriate boundary for copyright protection.29 Instead, it sought to
draw a new line between the utilitarian purpose of the program and the
expression, with emphasis on the economic incentives for programmers that
underlay copyright law policy. 30 The court stated "[t]he rule proposed here,
which allows copyright protection beyond the literal computer code, would
provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most
valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development
of new computer devices that accomplish the same end."31 At this point, the
Whelan court stood for the opposite interest-the economic interest for
authors-which copyright law attempts to balance with public interest
emphasized by the Synercom court.
26 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222, 1236. This part of the court reasoning has been criticized by courts
and many commentators. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1025 (N.D.Cal.
1992) ("[Ihe Whelan rule distends copyright protection, placing off-limits alternative and improved
means of expression and thereby upsetting the uneasy balance which copyright attempts to maintain by
preventing free riders from ripping off creative expression while not stifling others from improving or
extending that expression."); Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2nd
Cir. 1992) ("Whelan's general formulation that a program's overall purpose equates with the program's idea
is descriptively inadequate."); NIMMER §13.03[F], 13-78.33 ("The critical flaw in this reasoning is that it
assumes that only one "idea," in copyright terms, underlies any computer program, and that once a
separable idea can be identified, everything else must be expression.").
27 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
28 Id. at 1238.
29 The Whelan court first distinguished Synercom on the ground that there was the complexity dif-
ference between the input format and computer program itself. Id. at 1239. The court also pointed out the
Synercom court's erroneous understanding of the legislative history of the Copyright Act, stating that
Congress did not intend to differentiate the treatment between computer software and other literal works of
which arrangement and coordination of the materials are protected under Article 103. Id. at 1239-40.
Answering the Synercom court's question regarding the underlying idea if the structure is expression, the
court further emphasized that the idea in plaintiffs program in Whelan is the efficient organization of a
dental laboratory. Thus, program structures are separable from the idea since there are many possible
program structures through which the idea can be expressed. Id. at 1240.
30 The Whelan court did consider the objective program parts such as file structure and screen output
in reaching this conclusion. But the court's discussion is rather limited to the evaluation of a testimony. See
Whelan, 797 F.2d. 1242-43.
31 Id. at 1237. As to the value of non-literal aspects of the program at issue, the court also stated that:
"The evidence in this case shows that Ms. Whelan spent a tremendous amount of time studying Jaslow
Labs, organizing the modules and subroutines for the Dentalab program, and working out the data
arrangements, and a comparatively small amount of time actually coding the Dentalab program." Id. at
1231.
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In Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World Inc.,32 the court ex-
pressly followed Whelan's rule. The primary issue argued in Broderbund
was the copyrightability of a screen display generated by the computer
software. The defendant developed and marketed a printing program for
IBM machines that had a very similar screen command menu to the
plaintiffs successful printing program for Apple computers.33 In finding the
screen display copyrightable, the Broderbund court simply applied Whelan
and recognized the single utilitarian purpose of the work as an unprotectable
idea, without verifying the scope of the rule with respect to screen
displays.34 In assuming that the Whelan rule applied to computer screen
displays in general, the Broderbund court did not discuss whether each
particular element of the screen display qualified for copyright protection.
After Broderbund, however, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to
follow the Whelan decision on the copyrightability of SSO in Plains Cotton
Co-Op. v. Goodpasture Computer Service Inc.35 Following the Synercom
decision, the Plains Cotton court concluded that the SSO of the plaintiffs
cotton market information program was an unprotectable idea, since the
SSO was dictated by external factors of the cotton market.36 While the
court did not fully articulate the rationale of the idea-expression doctrine, it
embraced the Synercom analogy, equating the SSO of the plaintiffs program
with the H-shift patter. 37
One characteristic of these early cases is that the courts did not under-
take much analysis of the non-literal elements of the program at issue when
they determined the copyrightability question. The structure and
organization of a particular program may have various aspects
corresponding to the various operations which the program is intended to
perform. In order to clarify the subject matter of copyright in cases
32 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.Cal. 1986).
33 Id. at 1130.
34 The Broderbund court erroneously interpreted Whelan as extending the copyright protection to the
.overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays." Id. at 1133. ("Whelan thus stands for
the proposition that copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but
rather that it extends to the overall structure of a program, including its audiovisual displays."). The Whelan
court dealt with the issue of the screen display in the context that the similarity of the screen display can be
indirect evidence of the decision of substantial similarity between the programs, not as the subject of the
copyright protection. (797 F.2d at 1244). See Johnson, supra note 4,965 n.88.
35 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987).
36 Id. at 1262.
37 Id. ("To the extent that input formats represent a level of computer software design more specific
than functional design and more general than line-by-line program design, the issue of their copyrightabil-
ity is relevant to the issue of whether GEMS infringes on protected Telcot designs."). See notes 22-24 and
the accompanying text.
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involving non-literal program elements, an objective analysis of the various
aspects of SSO, such as system architecture, algorithms and data structure,
is indispensable. 38 These cases, however, seem to stand on generalized
concepts of SSO and ambiguous analyses as to which non-literal aspects of
a particular program are protected under copyright. Such reasoning, without
the reinforcement of objective analysis of SSO elements, resulted in the
inconsistent conclusions of these cases. Moreover, it left the impression that
rationales of the cases were simply methods for justifying the desired
outcome.39
2. Later Screen Display Cases
Such insufficient attention to program elements was somewhat over-
come in later cases dealing with the copyrightability of the visual aspects of
computer software. In Digital Communications v. Softklone Distributing40
and Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,41 the courts developed
a method of analysis which focused more on the objective characteristics of
each element of the work at issue.
In Softklone, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the copy-
right of its successful communication program by copying its well-designed
"status screen," which displayed the status of operating parameters and a list
of command terms for the user's convenience.42 In CAMS, the defendant
developed a cost-estimating program that had a function and design signifi-
cantly similar to the plaintiffs program.43
The notable point in both the Softklone and CAMS decisions is that
the courts overcame the Whelan holding that a program can have only one
38 One commentator strongly advocates the necessity for establishing such definitions of program
parts for orderly development of copyright protection for computer software. John W. L. Ogilvie, Note:
Defining Computer Program Parts Under Learned Hand's Abstraction Test in Software Copyright
Infringement Cases, 91 MicH L. REv. 526 (1992). Likewise, another commentator pointed out that the
U.S. courts' lack of objective techniques for separating unprotectable elements ("systems and methods")
from a computer program in question has lead to inconsistent case law. Steven W. Lundberg, et al.,
Identifying Uncopyrightable Computer Implemented Processes and Systems, 9 COMPuTER LAW. 7 (Apr.
1992 39 See Samuels, supra note 1, 324 ("it seems to be an ex post facto characterization that justifies an
outcome based upon other, more concrete factors. Thus, if the outcome in a particular case is to be in-
fringement, the work is deemed to be protectable expression; if the outcome is to be non infringement, then
the work is described as an idea.").
40 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.Ga. 1987).
41 706 F. Supp. 984 (D.Conn. 1989).
42 Sofiklone at 449. The court followed this registration of the Copyright Office and held that the
status screen is considered a compilation of program terms. Id. at 462-63.
43 CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 988.
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unprotectable idea. Instead, the courts based their opinions on extensive
analysis on the objective features of the works. For example, the Softklone
court identified three elements of the program as unprotectable ideas and
then excluded them from the consideration of substantial similarity.44 The
CAMS court's analysis of the elements of screen display was even more
extensive. The court classified the screen display on a number of levels,
such as the sequence and flow of the screens, the screen display format, the
method of internal navigation on the screens, and the selection and
arrangement of status information as to the operation of the program.45 In
CAMS, the analysis of the copyrightability of screen displays is specifically
developed based on the classification of the elements of the work. Instead
of identifying only one utilitarian "idea" as the court had in Whelan, the
court identified several ideas corresponding to each element. In this
manner, the court could efficiently determine whether each particular
element of expression merged with the corresponding idea.
It is also interesting to note that both courts supported the
copyrightability of the arrangement, selection, and design of materials in
their conclusions. The Softklone court held that the arrangement,
highlighting and two-letter capitalization of the command menu were
copyrightable.46 Similarly, the CAMS court held that the two elements of
the screen display relating to the arrangement and selection of materials
were copyrightable expressions. 47 Both decisions were supported by the
44 Sofklone, 659 F. Supp. at 459. The court correctly described that the Whelan court did not extend
the copyright protection to the screen displays, and rejected the holding of Broderbund as being based on
misinterpretation of Whelan. Il at 455. "Mhe Broderbund court based its conclusion on what this court
believes to be an overexpansive and erroneous reading of Whelan .... The Third Circuit in Whelan dealt
only with the evidentiary use of the copying of screen displays for the purpose of establishing copying of
the underlying computer program. The Whelan case did not stand for, as Broderbund believed, the
proposition that screen displays are protected by the computer program's copyright from copying." The
court failed to distinguish between the idea of the program itself and the ideas underlying screen displays
that the court specified as subject matter of this case. The three ideas that the court enumerated were: (1)
the use of the screen display to inform user of the status of the program; (2) the use of a command driven
program; and (3) the use of two-key combinations to activate commands. These ideas belong to the
general ideas of the program rather than the ideas of the specific screen display at issue. This identification
of idea appears to be inconsistent with the court's approach which considers the screen displays as a work
separate from the program.
45 CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 994-99.
46 Softlone, 659 F. Supp. at 463.
47 Three such elements are: (1) the external sequence and flow of the screen displays in the creating-
an-estimate sequence; (2) the selection and arrangement of the status information on the status screen; and
(3) the selection and arrangement of the terms on the job identification screen. Softlkone, 659 F. Supp.,
994-96.
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analogy to the copyrightability of a compilation work, recognizing the
degree of creativity embodied in the original compilation of materials.48
In one sense, Softklone and CAMS represent a turning point in the
development of computer software cases. Perhaps as the result of the in-
creased complexity of the programs involved, the courts appear to have
gradually moved away from simple reliance on the Whelan rule. Instead,
the courts are working to establish an analytic "process" for applying the
idea-expression doctrine, based on an extensive analysis of the objective
factors of the work. In this manner, the courts may reach reasonable
conclusions in ever more intricate computer software cases.
3. User Interface Cases
The approach to second-generation questions reached a notable stage
when the courts considered the copyrightability of "look and feel" and "user
interface ' 49 in Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp.50 and Lotus
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International.51 In Symantec,
the court adopted the objective analysis methodology developed by the
courts in Softklone and CAMS. The Symantec court held that copyright
protection could extend to the "look and feel" of screen displays in general,
although the court concluded that no copyrightable element existed in the
plaintiffs program.52
48 Sofiklone, 659 F. Supp. at 462-63. CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 996.
49 "User interface" is one of the non-literal aspects of computer software through which the user
communicates with the program. The importance of user interfaces has been increasing in software de-
velopment since it directly relates to the user's ease of use and productivity, which are significant factors of
software competitiveness. See Gerard J. Lewis Jr., Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
International: Broad Copyright Protection for User Interfaces Ignores the Software Industry's Trend
toward Standardization, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 689, 694 (1991).
50 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D.Cal. 1989). On April 7, 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the portion of the district court judgment on the copyright infringement claim, while it re-
manded the case to the district court on the ground that the district court did not decide on the plaintiffs
Federal Trademark/Trade Dress claim. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
1992).
51 Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 37 (D.Mass. 1990).
52 The usage of the "look and feel" concept in the computer software case has been criticized by
several commentators and courts. See 3 NaMMER. 13-36 ("it serves no purpose in the realm of computers
where analytic dissection and expert testimony emphatically are needed."). In Autoskill Inc. v. National
Educational Support Systems, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992), the court stated to the same effect,
citing NtAEMR. 793 F. Supp. 1570. See also Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 62 ("Despite its widespread use in
public discourse on the copyrightability of non-literal elements of computer programs, I have not found the
'look and feel' concept, standing alone, to be significantly helpful in distinguishing between non-literal
elements of a computer program that are copyrightable and those that are not.").
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In its landmark holding that the menu command structure of the plain-
tiffs spreadsheet program was copyrightable, the Lotus court first declared a
"legal test" for determining whether the user interface at issue was
copyrightable. The plaintiff developed a spreadsheet program called "1-2-
3," which was designed to meet the need for a more powerful spreadsheet
than the first successful commercial computer spreadsheet, VisiCalc.53 The
plaintiffs program had a powerful "user interface" that was different from
VisiCalc: a two-line menu command, user-defined function keys and a
macro instruction feature.54 The defendant also developed a spreadsheet
program in response to the success of VisiCalc; however, the defendant later
decided to improve the program so as to be compatible with 1-2-3 in terms
of the user interfaces in order to effectively compete with the 1-2-3. 55 The
Lotus court set out a three-step "evaluative" test for applying the idea-
expression distinction to computer software: (1) the court must determine
where to locate the idea underlying the work, between the generalized idea
and the particularized expression;56 (2) the court must determine whether
there is a limited number of ways to express that idea or whether the
expression is not essential to the idea; (3) if the court finds that the
expression is not essential to the idea, it must then determine whether that
expression is a substantial part of the work.57
Despite the systematic appearance of the evaluative test, the Lotus
court's conclusion still seemed to be led by the equitable considerations that
the non-literal aspects were the most valuable part of the work and that the
plaintiff had expended tremendous effort in their development. 58 The Lotus
53 Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
54 Id. at 63-65.
55 Id. at 69.
56 In applying the first test, the court held that the idea underlying the work was "the electric
spreadsheet" and that such an idea was not copyrightable. Id. at 65. The problem with this conclusion is
that the basis for the court's finding was not the idea of user interface on which the court should have
focused, but merely the general idea underlying the program itself. At this point, the court made a critical
mistake, which the CAMS court pointed out as a possible mistake in the court's identifying the idea of user
interface. Therefore, even though the Lotus court properly announced the legal tests, it failed to follow the
CAMS effective approach in applying the first test for identifying idea. Consequently, this flaw results in
the Lotus court's holding that the structure of menu commands is copyrightable without identifying what is
the sTcific underlying idea of the structure of menu commands.
T7 Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 60-61.
58 See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68 ("The user interface of 1-2-3 is its most unique element, and is the
aspect that has made 1-2-3 so popular."). Also, the court recognized that the legislative intent of the
copyright law mandated more protection for "the intellectual effort and creativity embodied in a user inter-
face" than that under the trade secret law. Id. at 56. The Lotus courts spent a substantial part of the deci-
sion on the discussion of copyright policy issue-economic incentive for authors versus the dissemination
of cultural knowledge. In this discussion, the court seems to opt for the economic incentive underlying
copyright law, emphasizing the innovative user interface of the plaintiff's program. See Lotus, 740 F.
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court thus stood on the same policy basis on which Whelan court had ex-
panded the copyright protection to SSO. This basis has been criticized in
recent copyright cases,59 leaving uncertainty about the applicability of the
Lotus test to future user interface cases. 6
0
4. Recent SSO Cases-Filtering Approach
As new cases have raised increasingly complex issues, courts have
gradually shifted the center of analysis to an extensive observation of the
elements and structure of the software at issue. In these cases, it is
becoming obvious that mere general analysis of the idea-expression doctrine
to separate protectable expressions from unprotectable ideas does not
provide a useful tool for the courts to determine the scope of copyright
protection for various non-literal aspects of computer software. Thus,
instead of exploring the limitations of the idea-expression doctrine, recent
courts have tried to establish a systematic analytic process for the idea-
expression distinction. One such attempt can be seen in the introduction of
the "filtering approach" in recent cases, which was originally proposed by
Professor Nimmer in his treatise.61
In Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems, Inc.,62 the
District Court for the District of New Mexico explicitly applied the
"filtering approach" to determine the copyrightability of the SSO of an
Supp. at 79 ("Mhe more innovative the expression of an idea is, the more important is copyright protection
for that expression.").
59 See infra note 87.
60 See Richard H. Stem, Legal Protection of Screen Displays and Other User Interface for Compu-
ters: A Problem in Balancing Incentives for Creation Against Need for Free Access to the Utilitarian, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 285,328. "Mhe court's approach raises serious problems because the scope of
it is so unpredictable.".
61 See Nimmer, et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer
Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARiz. ST. LJ. 625 (1988). See also 3 NIMMER, 13-78.28 to
.30. "The crucial consideration in the analysis that follows is that copyright law protects only an author's
original expression, not just an overall similarity between the works. Thus, before evaluating substantial
similarity, it is necessary to eliminate from consideration those elements of a program that are not protected
by copyright. To accomplish this task an allegedly infringed program should be analyzed on several
different levels. A different copyright doctrine is applied at each level, and material which is unprotected
under that doctrine is excluded from further consideration in analyzing substantial similarity. By
successively filtering out unprotected material, a core of protected material remains against which the court
can compare the allegedly infringing program (Footnotes omitted)." Professor Nimmer further proposed
four tests and doctrines excluding program elements that: (1) constitute only abstract ideas; (2) are dictated
by logic and efficiency; (3) are dictated by external considerations, such as software and hardware
standards and programming practices, and (4) are taken from the public domain, Id. at 13-78.30 to .44.
62 Autoskill, 793 F. Supp. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992).
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educational program for testing and training students. 63 The court refused to
adopt the Whelan rule on the ground that it neglected the reality that a
program may contain more than one idea.64 Instead, the court adopted the
"filtering approach," which allows courts to specify protectable elements by
successively applying the tests and copyright doctrines that function to
exclude unprotectable materials from the expressions at issue.
As the first step in the filtering approach, the court identified the idea
underlying the plaintiffs program: the testing and training of categories of
students by use of a computer. 65 The court then successively applied copy-
right doctrines to the expressions of these identified ideas to exclude unpro-
tectable elements of the expressions. Consequently, it held that the merger
doctrine precluded the use of thirteen skill categories based on English vow-
els and consonants from protection because such categories are dictated by
the nature of the English language. It next held that scenes a faire doctrine
filtered out the use of "Silent Sentence" and "Silent Paragraph" techniques
since they are standard methods in education programs.66 The court then
concluded that particular methods of reading and testing employed in the
plaintiffs program, such as testing components of sub-types, use of matrices
and graphs, were copyrightable expression.67
On the other hand, in Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai
Inc.,68 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied copyright protection for
SSO using the same filtering approach. In Altai, the court concluded that
the rewritten version of the defendant's program, a compatibility component
program that connected the plaintiffs job scheduling program with three
different operating systems of the IBM mainframe computers, did not
constitute copyright infringement.69 After rejecting the Whelan rule,70 the
63 Id. at 1559.
64 Id. at 1566. The court described the Whelan's rule as "a temptingly simplistic and bright line test."
Id.
65 Id. at 1566.
66 Id. at 1567-68.
67 Id. at 1568.
68 Altai, 982 F.2d at 693.
69 The district court of Altai compared the elements of the two programs' literal codes, parameter
lists, macros, the list of services, and high-level structure. First, as to the parameter lists and macros, the
court found that many of them were dictated by external factors, that is, the IBM's operating software that
belongs to the public domain, and thus not protected. Altai, 775 F. Supp. 544, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
Second, with regard to the list of services, while the evidence showed that the two programs shared com-
mon services, the court held that they did not constitute copyrightable elements since most of them were
determined by the functionality of the program. Id. at 562. Finally, as for the high-level structure, the
district court held that it constituted so obvious an expression that it could not be protected under copy-
right. Id.
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court adopted the successive filtering approach, which it described as a
"three step procedure:" Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison. The court
found this approach adequate for determining the copyrightability of non-
literal elements of a program.71 Under this approach, the court stated, a
court should first break down the allegedly infringed program into several
elements.72 At the first step of abstraction, the court must examine the
program and apply the abstraction scale in the order opposite to that which a
programmer usually takes during program development-starting with the
literal codes and ending with the ultimate function of the program. 73 Once
the unprotectable ideas are thus identified, the inquiry moves to the next
step: filtering out all unprotectable elements from the overall elements by
successively applying the established copyright doctrines such as the non-
copyrightability of the elements taken from the public domain or dictated by
efficiency and external factors, the merger doctrine, and the scenes a faire
doctrine.74 What ultimately remains after application of this test is a "core
of protectable material." 75
Strictly speaking, the filtering approach is a method to allow courts to
effectively identify the protectable elements, but it is not a test that
automatically separates unprotectable ideas from allegedly copyrightable
expressions by its application. Since the filtering approach does not contain
any standards that positively ratify the copyrightability of the remaining
elements of expression, a court's conclusion that the remaining elements are
protectible cannot be ratified unless it has completely filtered out all
unprotectable elements by thoroughly applying all appropriate tests and
doctrines supported by the given facts in a case. Especially, as Professor
Nimmer himself admitted, the first step in the application of the abstraction
70 The district court rejected Whelan on two grounds. First, it found Whelan's test, based on the
proposition that there exists only a separable idea in the computer program, was inadequate since it ne-
glected the reality of the computer program, citing Professor Nimmer's criticism of Whelan. Altai, 775 F.
Supp. at 559. Second, it also found that Whelan failed to recognize the fact that a computer program has
two distinct aspects: a textual aspect, which includes the source code and object code; and a behavioral
aspect, that includes the operations of a program. Both of which have their own structure, sequence and
organization. Id at 559-60.
71 Altai, 982 F.2d at 706. In finding this, however, the court also noted that this method was subject
to change in response to technological development. Id. ("[I1n cases where the technology in question does
not allow for a literal application of the procedure we outline below, our opinion should not be read to
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test would not be a simple task for courts.76 On this point, for example, the
Altai court merely explained the general procedure of the approach, but did
not proceed to indicate how the court actually identified ideas by applying
the abstraction test to the given facts in this case. The Autoskill court, on the
other hand, still fell into a critical confusion of the general idea of the work
and the idea of each particular element at issue in applying the various
copyright doctrines to each element.77 It is conceptually true that the
filtering approach can serve as a significant tool for courts in identifying
protectable non-literal elements. But the filtering approach is not fully
functional until the largely undefined processes of identifying the
underlying ideas though the application of the abstraction test are
sufficiently articulated. The Autoskill and Altai courts appear to have left
this issue unexplored.
5. Summary of the Development of Legal Tests
In the U.S. cases, the courts have been struggling to apply the axi-
omatic but ambiguous idea-expression dichotomy to the non-literal aspects
of computer software. The first notable attempt made by the Whelan court
resulted in a simple rule for distinguishing ideas from expression, but this
holding has been criticized for its extreme expansion of copyright protection
based on the erroneous understanding that only one idea exists in a program.
The courts after Whelan were required to untangle a more
complicated mixture of protectable and unprotectable elements, as well as to
analyze the rationale of two conflicting precedents-Whelan and
Synercom-as applied to a series of screen display cases. One consistent
tendency that the courts have shown in these cases is their favorable attitude
toward the copyrightability of the arrangement, selection, and design of
76 See 3 NIME 13-78.33 ("Unfortunately, even in the realm of computer software, the abstraction
test is not easy to apply.").
77 For instance, the Autoskill court merely identified the general idea underlying the program: the
testing, diagnosing and training of a particular category of students using the program. Consequently, the
court analyzed remaining elements after the screening and found substantial similarity because of (1) the
existence of a visual scanning test, (2) use of matrices for recording student progress, and (3) use of graphs
in the two programs. However, these three elements seem to be in the realm of specific ideas underlying
each component of the program. Instead, the court should have questioned the description of such
elements employed by the two programs: what style or method of visual tests the two programs employed,
or what kind or style of matrix and graphs they used, and considered the substantial similarity in these
descriptive aspects. If the court had identified the ideas corresponding to each element of the program
component, the court might have found that these two elements should be screened out in the course of
successive filtering.
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materials. 78  Perhaps because these elements are likely to contain a
relatively higher degree of creativity than other program elements, it would
be easier for courts to distinguish these elements from other stock
expressions or expressions that have limited variations and recognize them
as copyrightable expressions.
Because of the Whelan/Synercom antagonism, recent courts have
abandoned the search for a simple rule to distinguish ideas and expression in
computer software; instead they tend to seek an analytic method that enables
the courts to efficiently separate the protectable elements from the non-pro-
tectable elements in a given case. This approach is now represented by the
"4successive filtering" approach. While the adaptation of the "successive
filtering" approach should prevail on future courts, the current use of this
approach by the courts indicates that the process of identifying the
underlying idea is not yet adequately defined. Considering the importance
of this first step of identifying the ideas, the next issue which will confront
the courts following this approach is to clarify the steps or rules for
application of the abstraction test, recognizing that computer software
contains many ideas corresponding to the numbers of elements or features
included in the software.79
D. The Factual Situations in the U.S. Cases
Looking to the facts of the U.S. cases in which the courts developed
these legal tests, one notices that the courts have mostly reached reasonable
and straightforward results in each case, in light of the given facts. The
courts have consistently appreciated the equities in the factual situations,
and these underlying equitable factors have undoubtedly played a significant
role in determining the outcomes of these cases. 80
78 Copyrightability of compilation work consisting of non-protectable materials in other copyright
cases would support this trend. See Harper House Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.
1989) (schedule organizer), Levine v. McDonald's Corp., 735 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (music). See
Michael B. Bixby, Synthesis and Originality in Computer Screen Displays and User Interfaces: The "Look
and Feel" Cases, 27 WiL.LUAMErrL. REV. 31,49 & n.1 2 (1991).
79 The difficulty that the courts have had in identifying the underlying idea of a program in the
application of the idea-expression doctrine can be seen in other cases prior to the filtering approach cases.
See the previous discussions of Softkdone, supra note 44; Lotus, supra note 56; Autoskill, supra note 77.
80 Some commentators pointed out that the existence of equity in computer software cases has sig-
nificant effects on the decisions. See, e.g., Richard D. Moreno, "Look and Feel" as a Copyrightable
Element: The Legacy of Whelan v. Jaslow? Or, Can Equity in Computer Program Infringement Case Be
Found Instead By the Proper Allocation of Burden of Persuasion? 51 LA L.REV. 177 (1990). See also
Bixby, supra note 78, at 43. Dennis S. Kariala & Keiji Sugiyama, JAPAN-U.S. CoMPeuhr COPYRIGHT
LAW 196 (in Japanese, 1989).
SUTMMEiR 1993
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
For example, most of the cases in which the courts protected non-
literal aspects involved virtually identical copying of some critical elements:
in Broderbund, there was "the eerie resemblance between the screens of the
two programs;"81 in Softklone, stylistic expressions embodied in the two
programs were virtually identical.82 In a more recent case, the Lotus court
also recognized that the user interface of the two programs was "strikingly
similar." The primary copyright law policy of enhancing knowledge does
not favor this sort of "verbatim copying," since the second author does not
make any creative contribution or investment in the work.83
The courts have also been influenced by "bad faith" copying in cases
where the parties have had a close business relationship. In Whelan, the
defendant had received substantial technical assistance from the plaintiff,
which enabled the defendant to develop its own program, and moreover, the
defendant was a sales representative of the plaintiffs program.84 The
Whelan court implied that the defendant could not have completed the
development of the program without the plaintiffs extensive efforts.85 In
Broderbund, the court appeared to be influenced by the equitable
considerations that the plaintiff had previously disclosed to the defendant
the source code and technical points of the program in the course of license
negotiations. 86 Likewise, the defendant in CAMS was working as a sales
representative for the plaintiffs program and apparently developed its
program based on information obtained through this relationship.87 Such
81 Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1137. One commentator described Broderbund as "actually [an]
equity case, in which the court was so outraged by the extent of copying that the court was going to find an
infringement one way or the other." Johnson, supra note 4, 965 [citing Conley, 'Look and Feel' in Defense
of the Current Case Law, 5 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 2 (Dec. 1988)].
82 See 659 F. Supp. 449, app. Exhibit A and B at 465-66. They apparently indicate that the two
screens are identical, except for the lists of available commands. On this point, Soft klone is distinguishable
from Synercom because the input format consisted of a mere sequence of data that contained minimal
stylistic creativity.
83 See Apple, 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1021-22.
84 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226-27.
85 The Whelan court acknowledged some other factors that support the defendant's "free-riding"
activities. For example, the defendant failed to develop the program by himself due to his inexperience in
computer software prior to receiving help from the plaintiff. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1225. The district court
of Whelan acknowledged that the defendant was quite familiar with the plaintiffs program and he utilized
the source code of the plaintiffs program in his attempt to develop the IBM-PC Dentcom program.
Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1321. The district court also considered the fact that the defendant stated in the
advertisement of his program, "At last the 'dentalab' system available under ten thousand dollars." Id. at
1322.
86 While the license negotiation consequently failed, the defendant apparently utilized such infor-
mation in developing his program. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1130.
87 CAMS, 706 F. Supp. at 988. The access of the defendants in CAMS was limited to the appearance
of screen displays, and promotional material of the plaintiffs program. The court expressly denied that the
defendant had access to the source code of the program. Id. at 988-89. While the plaintiffs claim based on
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situations seem to move the courts to extend copyright protection in order to
achieve justice in the case at hand.
These factual findings were sometimes supported by the courts' rec-
ognition that a particular non-literal aspect may be the most valuable
product of the author's efforts.88 The Whelan court expressly noted that the
plaintiffs valuable efforts to develop the program's SSO should be protected
under copyright; otherwise useful technology developments would be
hampered. 89 In Lotus, the court also appeared to appreciate the fact that it
was the user interface of the plaintiffs program which made the program so
popular.90
Thus, the expansion of copyright protection to non-literal aspects was
to some degree propelled by strong equitable factors in the factual
situations. The courts found it necessary to preclude "bad faith" free riders
who misappropriated the most valuable portions of programs. This contrasts
well with the factual situations in Plains Cotton, Symantec, and Altai, the
cases in which courts denied copyright protection for non-literal elements.
In these cases, the "good faith" defendants did not engage in verbatim
copying.91 In Plains Cotton and Altai, the courts appear to have appreciated
the breach of fiduciary duty came from this business relationship, the court rejected this part of the claim
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish that it had control over the defendant's activities. Id. at
1005.
88 This proposition, what is known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine (a concept that copyright is a
reward for the author's hard efforts) was flatly rejected by a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision ("[T]he
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors."). Feist Publications Co., Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991). Shortly after the Whelan court supported this
doctrine, the same Second Circuit rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine in Financial Information, Inc.
v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986): "[C]opyright is not to be determined by
the amount of effort the author expends, but rather by the nature of the final result." Id. at 207. The
Second Circuit in Altai also rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine in computer software cases, expressly
referring to Feist and Whelan. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 706. See also Autoskill, 793 F. Supp. at 1571
89 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
91 In Symantec, seventeen alleged similarities did not include virtually identical elements. Also,
Symantec involved a unique factual situation in which two programs that were to perform the same func-
tion were developed by the same programmer. It is thus natural that the two programs share common
features. That is not unusual in the software industry. Even in such a situation, the programmer may not
be precluded from applying the same idea to another program that he or she may develop in the future.
Such a preclusion would amount to an unreasonable limitation on the programmer's own skill and experi-
ence. In most computer software cases, the policy issue of the idea-expression distinction is presented as a
determination of the parts of an existing program (developed by another programmer) a programmer may
use and which parts the programmer may not. In Symantec, however, the policy issue involved a more
serious and complicated phase; that is, which parts of a program (developed by a programmer but assigned
to a third party) the programmer may use repeatedly in other programs as ideas constituting the
programmer's own skill or experience, and which parts the programmer may not use. The same issue was
presented in a music case which has a similar factual situation as Symantec. See Fantasy Inc. v. Fogerty,
654 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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the fact that the defendants made reasonable efforts to avoid
misappropriation of the plaintiffs' programs in developing or rewriting their
own programs.92 While these two tendencies will be interwoven in future
developments of the case law, it appears that in the future courts will
become more careful in expanding copyright protection to non-literal
aspects through the development of the filtering approach.
III. JAPANESE LAW
A. Background
Until the early 1980s, legal protection for computer software in Japan
was a fairly non-existent issue because there were few disputes concerning
computer software. However, after a series of cases involving popular video
games, the issue was recognized as a problem which called for legislative
action. With respect to statutory protection of computer software, there was
a heated debate between two government offices: the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI), which administers Japanese patent policy,
and the Cultural Affairs Agency (CAA), which administers Japanese copy-
right policy. MITI advocated the creation of a sui generis right for
computer software, arguing that this approach would provide legal
protection appropriate for its status as economic property.93 On the other
hand, CAA's proposal was based on the facts that computer software was
already held by Japanese courts to be copyrightable, and that the
international trend was toward protection of computer software under
copyright law. CAA thus proposed amending the Copyright Act in order to
clarify the scope of the protection for computer software under the statute.94
In 1985, the Japanese Diet finally adopted the CAA's proposal in
order to be in harmony with copyright protection systems of the other
92 For example, the Plains Cotton court found that: (1) the defendants developed their program
based on "their knowledge of the cotton industry and expertise in computer programming and design
gained over a number of years;" (2) the defendant's employer replaced the copied subroutine from the
plaintiffs program and discharged the responsible employee; and (3) one of the defendants wrote subrou-
tines without referring to any material or information concerning the plaintiff's program. Plains Cotton,
807 F.2d at 1259-61.
93 The MITI proposal emphasized the creation of a right of use (Shiyo-Ken). The proposal also
contained such notable features as: (1) the abolition of moral rights; (2) a registration requirement for legal
protection; (3) a 15-year term, in parallel with patent law; and (4) an introduction of compulsory licensing.
See Proposal with Respect to Rearrangement of the Foundation for Software-Aiming at Security Legal
Protection for Software (in Japanese, MIT, Dec. 1983).
94 Interim Report of the Copyright Council, Sixth Subcommittee (in Japanese, CAA, Jan., 1984).
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leading countries. 95 Under the new Copyright Act, computer software is
protected as a separate category, "program works" (Programu no
Chosakubutsu). Article 2(1)(x) now defines program works as "an
expression of a combination of instructions and statements capable of
causing a computer having information processing capabilities to achieve a
particular result," and Article 10 includes program works in the enumeration
of works of authorship [Article 10(1)(ix)].96
Now that computer software is expressly covered by the Japanese
Copyright Act, it of course must satisfy the general requirement for works of
authorship 97 in order to qualify for protection. Article 2(1)(i), which defines
the works protected by copyright, states that a protectable work: (1) must
express thoughts or sentiments; (2) must be expressed in a creative way; (3)
must fall within a literary, academic, artistic or musical domain.98 In
contrast to the U.S. Copyright Act, which does not have a definition of
protected works, the Japanese Copyright Act seems to set higher
requirements with respect to the qualities of works eligible for copyright
protection. 99 The "creativity"100 requirement in particular has functioned as
95 Id. The report states that England, Germany, France and Netherlands were of the opinion that
computer software should be protected under the copyright law although none of them had any explicit
provisions in their copyright acts. It is also said that the Diet's adaptation of the CAA's proposal was under
strong pressure from the U.S., since the U.S. had already established copyright protection for computer
software by the 1980 amendment of the Copyright Act. The U.S. opposition to MiTIs proposal was
especially due to its compulsory licensing provisions that would have allowed Japanese companies to
license U.S. companies' software by paying a small amount of royalties. See Nobuhiro Nakayama,
Sofutouea no Houteki Hogo, 12 (Legal Protection for Software) (1988) (in Japanese). However, it appears
that the U.S. argument was based on a misunderstanding of the MITI proposal. First, MIlTs proposal was
limited to only three cases: (1) where a program is made by using existing programs or patented inventions;
(2) where compulsory license is necessary for the public benefit; or (3) where the existing programs have
not been used, and the proposal explicitly indicated that the provisions must be construed so as not to
invade the existing right of the copyright owner. Second, the compulsory license was not automatically
allowed, as is the U.S. copyright compulsory license (§ 111, § 115, § 116, § 118, and § 119 of the U.S.
Copyright Act), but made upon the authorizing committee's decision. See i. at 12-13.
96 The 1986 Amendment also included "database" as deserving a separate category of protection as a
kind of compilation work. Article 2(l)(x-iii) defines "database" as "collection of theses, numbers, figures,
or other information, which are systematically organized so that they can be searched by using computers."
Also, Article 12-1(1) states that a "[d]atabase which has creativity in selection of information or its
systematic organization shall be protected as a work of authorship."
97 Under the Japanese Copyright Act, "fixation" is not required for a work in general to be protected.
The fixation requirement is expressly provided for cinematograhic works under Article 2(3).
98 Article 2 defines "works of authorship" as "the creative expression of thoughts and sentiments
which belongs to the literary, academic, art or music domain." Article 2(l)(i).
99 See Dennis S. Karjala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts in Japanese and American
Copyright Law, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L. 613,621(1988).
I The original Japanese term "sousakusei" can be translated to either" originality" or "creativity."
However, "creativity" seems to be the better choice so as to distinguish "sousakusei" from "originality."
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a substantial threshold which the Japanese courts have often invoked to bar
copyright protection. Generally speaking, therefore, the creativity
requirement under the Japanese Copyright Act is not necessarily equivalent
to the "originality" requirement under the U.S. Copyright Act, since the
latter is not recognized as a substantial obstacle to copyright protection. In
the recent Japanese computer software cases discussed below, the creativity
requirement has been utilized to deny copyright protection for program
elements when protection would result in a monopoly of the underlying
ideas.
One of the most significant outcomes of the 1985 Amendment is that
the Japanese Copyright Act expressly provides for exclusions from
copyright protection that are only applicable to program works. Article
10(3) states:
The protection granted by the Law to the works of authorship
enumerated in (1)(ix) of this article does not extend to a pro-
gramming language, rule, or algorithm which is used for
creating the works. In this case, the meanings of these terms
are subject to the following definitions:
(i) "Programming language" means characters or other symbols
or their organization, which are used for methods of expression.
(ii)"Rule" means special conventions with regard to the usage
of the programming language defined in the preceding item in a
particular program.
(iii)"Algorithm" means methods for the combination of instruc-
tions to computers.
Among these exclusions, the exclusion of the algorithm has an impor-
tant role in determining the scope of the protection for non-literal elements
of a program. Because the scope of the exclusion is clarified in the statute,
Japanese courts supposedly can draw a clearer line between protectable and
unprotectable elements in computer software cases without relying upon the
ambiguous idea-expression doctrine. 101 However, recent Japanese cases
See Karjala, supra note 6, 237, n.19. See also Edward G. Durney, Protection of Computer Programs
Under Japanese Copyright Law, 9 PAC. BASIN LJ. 17, 38 n.61 & 40 n.69 (1991).
101 Unlike the U.S. Copyright Act, the Japanese Copyright Act does not have a provision expressly
excluding "ideas" from copyright protection. The general concept of idea-expression distinction has been
established by the courts. They have interpreted that the usage of the word "expression" in Article 2(I)(i)
excludes ideas from the copyright protection. See, e.g., Ueda v. KK. Nishin (Perpetual Calendar Case),
VOL. 2 No. 2
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
seem to indicate that there is some uncertainty in the Japanese courts' appli-
cation of Article 10(3).
B. The Early Case Law102
1. The Development of Legal Tests
The cases categorized as "early case law" below are cases decided
based on the Japanese Copyright Act before the 1985 Amendment. Since
the previous statute did not clearly establish the copyrightability of
computer software, the courts in these cases mostly discussed "first
generation" issues, i.e., the question of whether computer software was
protected under copyright, and if so, under which category of works. While
none of the cases in this category directly discusses the copyrightability of
non-literal aspects of computer software, the analysis in these cases and the
courts' interpretation of relevant articles of the Japanese Copyright Act
provide important clues to the analysis of the recent case law, discussed
later.
K.K. Taito v. K.K. ING Enterprisesl03 is a landmark case in which a
Japanese court first held that the object code of computer software was
copyrightable. The plaintiff was the manufacturer of "Space Invader II," a
video game which enjoyed great commercial success in this market. The
defendant, upon request of customers who owned outdated video game
machines, converted those machines to run the plaintiffs video game.104 In
doing so, the defendant installed the object code stored in the plaintiffs
ROM chip onto the ROM chips of the customers' machines. 105 In holding
that the object code stored in the plaintiffs ROM chip was a copyrightable
Judgement of Jan. 24, 1984, Osaka District CL, 1102 Hanrei Jih5 132. In Ueda, the court held that the
structure of plaintiffs perpetual calendar was an utilitarian idea that was not protected under copyright. See
also Karjala & Sugiyama, supra note 99, at 649.
102 In Japan, there are two special divisions of district court for dealing with intellectual property
law cases; Twenty-ninth Division of Tokyo District Court and Twenty-first Division of Osaka District
court. Since each division consists of the judges who are experts in intellectual property law, their deci-
sions are treated to have more precedential value than other courts decisions. Because the judges of each
division changes frequently, the decisions from the same division are not always in accord. See Kadjala &
Sugiyama, supra note 99, n.6 and accompanying text.
103 Judgement of Dec. 6, 1982, Tokyo Dist. CL 1060 Hanrei Jih5 18.
104 Id. at21.
105 Il The defendant argued that the object code of the plaintiffs program was not copyrightable,
since such a machine language is neither human-readable nor the expression of human thoughts. The
defendant thus argued that it fell outside the categories of copyrightable works enumerated in Article 10(1)
of the Copyright Act. l at 20.
SUTMMR 1993
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
work of authorship, 106 the court reasoned that the object code program could
be deemed a creative expression of the author's academic thoughts, since it
was based on the author's discovery of solutions that necessitated the
author's logical thinking.107 The court also held that the defendant's conduct
in extracting the object code from the plaintiffs ROM chip and installing it
onto other ROM chips constituted a copying of the plaintiffs work under
Article 2(1)(xv) of the Japanese Copyright Act. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the defendant's conduct infringed the plaintiffs copyright.108
In Konami Kogyo K.K. v. K.K. DaiwaJ9 the court undertook the
same logical process as Taito in finding the object code of the plaintiffs
program was copyrightable. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of a video
game "Strategy X." The defendant marketed a game called "Strong X,"
which was virtually identical to the plaintiffs game. In the manufacturing
process, the defendant extracted object code from the plaintiffs ROM on the
printed circuit board and copied it onto the defendant's ROM. The plaintiff
asserted that its video game was protected under copyright as a literary
work. The defendant unsuccessfully contended that the plaintiffs video
game could be easily developed by using basic knowledge of video games,
and hence that it lacked originality. The court found that the plaintiffs
video game program was copyrightable because of its creative expression of
thoughts different from other creators. The court also held that the
defendant's conduct in extracting the object code from the plaintiffs ROM
chip and installing the partially changed code onto other ROM chips
constituted a reproduction of the plaintiffs work.110
K.K. Namco v. Suishin Kogyo K.K.111 is the only Japanese case which
dealt with the copyrightability of the screen displays generated by computer
software. The Namco court held that the screen displays were copyrightable
as "cinematographic works" before the 1985 Copyright Act. In Namco, the
plaintiff claimed that defendants infringed the plaintiffs copyright of the
video game "PAC-MAN" as a cinematographic work by "performing" the
106 Id. at21.
107 Id.
108 Id. The Taito case was later followed by the Yokohama District Court in K.K Taito v. Makoto
Denshi Kogyo K.K, in which the facts were identical. Judgment of Mar. 30, 1983, Yokohama Dist. CL,
1081 Hanrei Jih6 125.
109 Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, Osaka Dist. Ct. 536 Hanrei Taimuzu 450.
110 In this case, the plaintiff also asserted that the work was alternatively protected as a cinema-
tographic work, but the court did not address this issue in its decision.
I 11 Judgment of Sep. 28, 1984, Tokyo Dist. Ct., 534 Hanrei Jih6 246.
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game to the public through illicit copies of the game machine.' 12 The court
first stated that cinematographic works under the Copyright Act must satisfy
three requirements: (1) the work must generate visual or audiovisual effects
similar to the effects of cinematographic works; (2) it must be fixed in a
medium; and (3) it must be a work of authorship.113 The court found that
"PAC-MAN" satisfied those three requirements. The first and third
requirements were satisfied without difficulty. The court reasoned that
displaying pictures on a video screen has similar effects to cinematography,
and that the plaintiffs video game contained creativity as a production of the
creator's intellectual or cultural activities. 114 With regard to the second
requirement of fixation, the court considered the issue of whether the screen
displays of the plaintiffs video game were capable of being reproduced.
115
The court held that they were reproducible, reasoning that if a player
operates the game machine in the same way in two different plays of the
game, the screen displays varied in the same way.
I16
In Microsoft Corp. v. Shuwa System Trading K.K,117 the court ad-
dressed the issue of the copyrightability of operating system software. The
plaintiff, an American corporation, developed an operating system program
112 The defendants argued that the plaintiff's video game did not fall within the definition of
cinematographic works for two reasons. First, it contended that the pictures generated by the video game
were mere tools for playing the game like a chesspiece and a chessboard. Id. at 251. Second, it argued that
the performance rights to cinematographic works were inherent in their unique distribution customs which
were utterly different from that of video games. l. at 251-52. The court expressly rejected the second
argument reasoning that there already existed other types of works protected as cinematographic works that
did not use the same distribution method as cinematographic works. A work is not precluded from the
category of cinematographic works by reason of a difference in distribution method. AL at 253.54.
ll3 Id. at 252. The court further elaborated the interpretation of these three requirements. First, with
regard to the first requirement, the court concluded that the visual effects were the essential element of
cinematographic works. IL at 253. As long as a work has the visual effects that are similar to cinema-
tographic works, it can meet this requirement regardless of the purpose of the work and the interaction of
players with the game. As to the second requirement, the court stated that the medium in which the work
must be fixed can be anything, including ROM chips. L The third requirement, the court stated, was
further divided into two elements under Article 2(l)(i) under the Copyright Act: (1) the work must consist
of creatively expressed thoughts or sentiments, and (2) the work must belong to the domain of literature,
science, art, or music. dLa The court then construed "literature, science, art, or music" to be the product of
intellectual or cultural activities in general. Therefore, whether the work has artistic, utilitarian, or
amusement purpose does not affect the copyrightability of the work. Il
114 Id at 254.
115 The Japanese Copyright Act does not generally require "fixation" in order for a work to be
copyrightable. Cinematographic work is the only exception which must meet the fixation requirement
(Article 2(3) of the Japanese Copyright Act).
116 543 Hanrei Jih5 at 254. It is interesting that this reasoning is identical with that in Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Il. 1983), in which the plaintiff, a
copyright holder of PAC-MAN in the United States, sued the defendant who made spied-up kits for PAC-
MAN.
117 Judgment of Jan. 30, 1987, Tokyo Dist. Ct. 1219 Hanrei Jih6 48.
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that worked on the PC-8001 personal computer manufactured by Nihon
Electric Company ("NEC"). n18 Neither the plaintiff nor NEC disclosed the
structure of the operating system program to the public.1 9 The defendant,
considering the needs of PC-8001 users to know the structure of their
operating system program, published a book which listed the source code of
the program, together with labels and annotative comments on the list.120 In
the course of making the book, the defendant translated the object code of
the program into hexadecimal code and then disassembled and interpreted
the object code. 121 The court recognized that the program was created by
using a high degree of technical knowledge of the program language, and
therefore it was regarded as a work within the academic domain.122 The
defendants contended that an operating system software should not be
protected under copyright, since the creator's thoughts and sentiments were
excluded from the operating system software for the purpose of more
efficient and quick data management. 123 The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that an operating system program, like an application program,
can have uniqueness by reflecting a creator's character in analyzing the
problems to achieve the program's purpose and in selecting an algorithm
from various choices. 124 The court then discussed whether disassembling
and interpreting the object code and attaching the labels and comments was
also a reproduction. While the court acknowledged the differences in
expression between the object code and the book, it found that those
differences were derived only from the more explanatory purpose of the
book, and were therefore unimportant. 125 Accordingly, the court concluded
that disassembling and interpreting the object code and attaching the labels
and comments also constituted a reproduction of the plaintiffs program.
126
118 Id. at 49.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 52.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 55.
123 Id. at52.
124 Id. at 55.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 55-56. The court also rejected the defendants' arguments of fair use and non-creativity.
The defendants argued that the publication of the book required independent research and creative activi-
ties and that it was made for the benefit of NEC PC-8001 users. In rejecting these arguments, the court
reasoned that whether or not an allegedly infringing work has creativity or individuality did not affect the
determination of infringement, and that the disclosure of the source code of the program to the public
against the author's intention was not justified by the fact that it was done for the convenience of the users.
Id. See Nakayama, Publication of a Disassembled Operating System, 634 HANREI TAIMUZU 46,49 (1987).
But one commentator states that the creator's desire to keep the program as a trade secret should not affect
VOL. 2 No. 2
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
2. Factual Situations
As shown in the above cases, early development of legal protection
for computer software in Japan was triggered by a series of video game
program cases: Taito, Konami, and Namco. Through these three cases, the
Japanese courts established copyright protection for computer software,
which was later codified in the 1985 Amendment. It should be noted that
there is one common factual situation among those three cases; that is, the
defendants' programs in these cases were the products of defendant's
mechanical or "dead" copying of the literal code of the plaintiffs program.
In each case, the fact that the defendant's program was a virtually verbatim
copying of the code of the plaintiffs program was not disputed. In other
words, as for the copying, the defendants were mere "free riders"
contributing no creativity and no cost investment. As such, they could not
benefit from copyright law's underlying policy to enhance the culture and
learning of the public.
The Microsoft case appears to carry a slightly different meaning than
these cases. The defendant's book and the plaintiffs program were not
identical since they had different modes of expression. However, as the
Microsoft court recognized, the difference was derived from the difference
in the nature of the works: a book and a program. Aside from this
difference, the defendant's work was based on an identical copy of the
source code of the plaintiffs work. The factual situation of the Microsoft
case thus can fall in with the verbatim copying cases.
In sum, all of the cases discussed above share a common factual situ-
ation, in that each involved virtually verbatim copying of the literal aspects
of programs by the defendant. Under such factual circumstances, the only
reasonable conclusion was to hold for the plaintiff by affirming the
copyright protection for the infringed program. In these cases, none of the
courts were faced with the difficulty of drawing a line between the idea and
the expression; nor were they required to balance the policy considerations
favoring each party.
the conclusion. See Karjala, The First Case on Protection of Operating Systems and Reverse Engineering
of Programs in Japan, 10 EUR. INTEIL PROP. REV. 172, 176 & n.27 (1984).
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C. Current Case Law
1. The Development of Legal Tests
In two recent decisions, System Science K.K. v. Tokyo Sokki K.K.127
and K.K. ICM v. K.K. Met's,128 Japanese courts addressed the second gen-
eration issue, the copyrightability of non-literal aspects of software. In these
provisional relief cases, the courts discussed copyrightability of "processing
flow" (Shori no Nagare) or organization of a program, which seems to be
the equivalent with what the U.S. courts call SSO.129 While both of the
courts rejected the copyrightability of "processing flow" or organization of
programs, their analyses conflict in terms of the statutory grounds for why
such elements may not be copyrightable.
In System Science, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants retrieved
four of the plaintiffs programs from the ROMs installed in the plaintiffs
hardware systems and copied them onto the ROMsin the defendants' hard-
ware systems. 130 One of the four programs, the CA-9 program, was
allegedly an adaptation of the plaintiffs CA-7 II program. Some literal
expressions and "processing flow" of the CA-9 were identical with those of
the CA-7 II program.131
The court upheld the district court's decision that CA-9 did not consti-
tute an infringement of the plaintiffs copyright of CA-7 II.132 The court
first supported the district court's proposition that there must be "creativity"
in the similarities between the two programs in order for the infringement to
be established. 133 The court then stated:
127 Judgment of June 20, 1989, Tokyo High Ct., 1322 Hanrei Jih6 138.
128 Judgment of Mar. 27, 1991, Tokyo Dist. Ct. 23-1 Chiteki Saishu 139.
129 Professor Karjala expressed a similar opinion that the processing flow mentioned in System
Science "sounds very much like" what the Whelan court defined as SSO. Karala, supra note 6, 232-33.
130 1322 Hanrei Jih6 at 141-42.
131 Id. at 142-43.
132 The district court first discussed whether or not CA-9 was an adaptation of CA-7 H. The court
stated two requirements for the infringement of the adaptation right: the access to the plaintiffs program
and the similarity between the two programs. It further stated that the infringement of the adaptation right
was not established if similarities between the two programs only exist in the portion of the program in
which no creativity could be found. Id. at 143.
133 1322 Hanrei Jih6 at 140. "In order for a program to be found to infringe [the] copyright of a
program work, it is required that a portion of the combination of instructions of the program work be found
to be creative, and the combination of instructions of the later developed program be similar to the portion
of the program work that can be found to be creative."
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In a program, the symbols used for expression are ex-
tremely limited, and the system (grammar) of the programming
is strict. Because of this, if it is intended to effectively obtain
the same result by having a computer operate, there is
'inevitable room for similarity in the combination of
instructions. Therefore, with regard to a computer program, the
determination of copyright infringement must be made
carefully. 134
Based on this recognition, the court found that the similarities
between the two programs were inevitable because of hardware constraints
and common methods of expression. Therefore, these aspects of the
program contained no creativity.135 With regard to the "processing flow" of
the program, the court held that it was not protected under copyright since it
fell within the definition of "algorithm" (kaiho) under Article 10(3)(fii) of
the Japanese Copyright Act. 136 Thus, the similarities in this regard were
excluded from the determination of creativity. Finally, the court noted that
the sizes of the two programs were substantially different; 12K bytes
(12,288 bytes) of CA-7 II and 763 bytes of CA-9. The court also noted that
the allegedly similar portion of the programs was very small compared to
the overall size of the two programs. 137 Accordingly, the court concluded
that there was not sufficient evidence showing that CA-9 constituted an
infringing adaptation of CA-7 H.
The court's opinion that "processing flow" is unprotectable algorithm
is a landmark opinion, but one should be careful in assessing this authority.
First, this opinion was stated as dictum. In System Science, the center of the
appeals court's discussion was on whether there was a lack of creativity in
the literal aspects of the program. Second, this portion of the appeals court's
opinion was so brief that it did not include any elaboration of the meaning of
"1processing flow" in connection with the definition of "algorithm" under
Article 10(3)(iii), or any explanation of a concrete rationale for equating





138 The District Court considered the similarities in the "processing flow" in the analysis of creativ-
ity by specifying several examples of "processing flow" at issue. The Tokyo High court, however, did not
address this part of the district court opinion. 1322 Hanrei Jih5 at 142.
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In the most recent case, K.K. ICM v. K.K. Met's, the plaintiff devel-
oped a utility program that automatically installed application programs
onto the hard disks of NEC PC-9801 personal computers. 139 The allegedly
infringed program was one of the component files that constituted the
plaintiffs utility program, which was called the "LBF file." The IBF file
consisted of 81 subfiles, corresponding to each of 81 popular application
programs for PC-9801, together with stored instructions for each particular
application program.140 The IBF file was designed to provide such
instructions and information for the "MENU.EXE file" so that it could
execute the installation process of various application programs.141
The defendants developed a utility program that allegedly had the
same function, file structure and organization as the plaintiffs program. The
defendants' utility program had a file that corresponded to the IBF file,
which was called the "HCA file." The plaintiff claimed a copyright
infringement of 41 of the 81 IBF files and sought provisional relief to stop
the defendants' sales of the program. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants' HCA file was a copy of the IBF file, since there was a one-to-
one correspondence with the IBF file in terms of "processing flow" and
"algorithm."
14 2
Presuming that the IBF file could be regarded as a program, the court
concluded that the IBF file was not copyrightable on three grounds. First,
the court held that the "organization"'14 3 of the IBF file was not protected
under copyright since it was a grammar (Bunpou) of characters, other
symbols or their systems under Article 10(3)(i) of Japanese Copyright
139 23-1 Chiteki Saishu at 140.
140 ld. at 141-42.
141 Id. at 153. The structure of the IBF file was not complicated. It consisted of 9 lines such as: the
"ID Line," which enables MENU.EXE to check if the file was the correct IBF file; the "Title Line," which
describes the name of the application program covered by the file; the "Device Line," which provides
information about the device driver, the "Command Line," which creates an auto-execution batch file for
the application program; the "Message Line," which contains the message displayed on the screen in-
structing users to insert floppy disks of the application programs; and the "Installation Process Line,"
which provides MENU.EXE with directions to copy the designated files onto subdirectories of the hard
disk.
142 Id. at 144. The defendants raised two arguments against the plaintiff's claim. First, they argued
that the IBF file was not a program but a mere data file dictated by simple Japanese and English. Second,
they also argued that the IBF file did not meet the statutory requirement of creativity since it was a mere
combination of the names of application programs and selection of files that should be installed on the hard
disk, which was pre-determined by each application program.
143 It is not clear from the record what the court meant by "organization" of the IBF file. Consider-
ing that the court referred to the sequence and structure of the IBF file, e.g. the ID line, the Title line, the
Device Line, etc., when it reasoned that such "organization" was not copyrightable, the court seemed to
regard what the U.S. court calls SSO as just the "organization" of the file.
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Act.144 The court also held that there was no room for creativity in the
selection of forms since the number of ways to select the files was
constrained by MENU.EXE.145 Second, as to the literal expressions of the
IBF file, the court held that they also lacked creativity because the lines
constituting the IBF file were dictated by the external factors,
MENU.EXE146 and the application program to be installed. Third, as to the
copyrightability of the selection of files to be installed on a hard disk, the
court held that the selection was an idea not protected under copyright. 147
The most important aspect of ICM is that unlike System Science, the
court did discuss the copyrightability of non-literal aspects of the program in
a way directly relating to the holding of the case. The ICM court's treatment
of the "organization" of the IBF file in connection with the Article 10(3),
however, seems to be inconsistent with the System Science analysis. In
ICM, the court presumably referred to SSO simply as "organization," and
held that it fell within the category of "programming language" under
Article 10(3)(i). On the other hand, the System Science court treated SSO,
which it called "processing flow," as "algorithm" under Article 10(3)(iii).
While there is ambiguity in the language used by both courts, it appears that
System Science and ICM flatly denied the copyrightability of the SSO on
different statutory grounds. Thus, the ICM decision at least indicates that
Japanese courts' treatment of SSO is not yet unified.
148
144 Id. at 157. The court did not provide further rationale for the ambiguous equation of blank form
with a 5amar of programming language under Article 10(3)(i).
146 Id. at 157-58.
It is doubtful whether MENU.EXE was a completely external factor to the IBF file. Both the IBF file
and MENU.EXE constitute the component parts of one program and they are designed by the same plain-
tiff. It appears that the plaintiff designed the IBF file as a database for MENU.EXE so that they can inter-
act to efficiently perform the specific function of the program. While the plaintiff did not claim the copy-
right infringement of MENU.EXE, both files appear to be sufficiently tied with each other so that they
could represent the author's creativity as a whole. Moreover, the doctrine of external factors is to preclude
copyright protection from a work that comes from considerations "external to an author's creativity." 3
NIMMER 13-78.36 (emphasis added).
Considering those factors, the MENU.EXE could not be truly external to the IBF file since
MENU.EXE is in any event within the creativity of the same author of the IBF file. Looking at both files
this way, one cannot simply say that the IBF file lacked the creativity on the ground that it is constrained
by MENU.EXE. Likewise, one commentator stated that the court should have considered both the IBF file
and MENU.EXE as one work of authorship. The commentator also stated that the IBF file could be
protected as a kind of compilation work or database file under Article 12 or 12-2 of Japanese Copyright
Act. Masao Yoshida, "Purogramu ni okeru Fairu no Selkaku to Sousalassei" (Comment: The Character
and Creativity of Files in a Program), 108 KOGY6 SHOYUKENHO KENKYU 24 (in Japanese).
147 ICM, 23-1 Chiteki Minshu 159.
148 The ICM court's equation of SSO with programming language would sound more likely to be
erroneous than System Science court's equation with algorithm. It is obvious that the definition of
"programming language" under Article 10(3)(i) means the method of expressing a program such as BASIC,
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2. Factual Situations
The System Science court was faced with a factual situation which a
Japanese court had never before addressed: a work which was not a
verbatim copy of the literal code but was identical in non-literal aspects to
the plaintiffs program. On this point, the court excluded "processing flow"
from consideration and concluded that there was no infringement, even
though "processing flow" of the two programs was allegedly identical. The
key facts in this opinion are that the sizes of the two programs were
substantially different (763 bytes to 12,288 bytes), and moreover, that the
size of the allegedly similar portion was a tiny portion of the 763 bytes.149
These facts indicate not merely that the CA-9 was far from an identical copy
of CA-7 II as a whole in terms of literal aspects, but also that the non-literal
aspects of such a trivial portion could not raise a substantial similarity issue.
If the court had considered the issue of the similarity of "processing flow," it
would have held that the similarity was in any event not substantial due to
the nominality of the allegedly similar "processing flow." 150 In other words,
since the CA-9 was not significantly similar to begin with, the court did not
need to enter deeply into consideration of whether the non-literal aspects of
the CA-7 II should be copyrightable.
As with System Science, the facts in ICM with regard to the simplicity
of the program at issue provides a clue to understanding the value of this
decision. It should be noted that the structure of the file in question was
extraordinarily simple for computer software. The IBF file itself contained
only 9-lines of structure and was written in mostly plain Japanese and
English. 151 Thus the defendant persuasively argued that it could not be a
program work. The court, however, did not discuss this issue; instead it
assumed that the file was a "program work" and then proceeded to discuss
whether it satisfied the statutory requirement of creativity. That is, the ICM
court's holding concerning the copyrightability of the structure of the IBF
file was made without considering whether or not the IBF file itself satisfied
the elements of a "program work."152 The IBF file seemed to be so
COBOL and FORTRAN. It appears to be difficult to expand the meaning of "programming language" to
something covering the SSO of a program.
149 See System Science, 1322 Hanrei Jih6 140.
150 Of course, it is theoretically possible that "processing flow" is qualitatively significant At best,
the plaintiff did not assert that it would represent the critical portion of the program.
151 See supra note 141.
152 On March 31, 1992, the Tokyo High Court denied the appeal of the defendant in ICM. While the
details of the decision are not available, the high court held that the IBF file was merely a data file,
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primitive that there could be no legal discussion as to whether its non-literal
aspects qualified for copyright protection.
D. Summary and Analysis of Case Law-Comparative Aspects
1. "Originality" vs. "Creativity"
The Japanese case law, when compared to the U.S. case law, seems to
indicate that the Japanese courts have avoided the complicated idea-expres-
sion doctrines adopted by the U.S. courts. Instead, mainly because the
nature of a civil law system makes the court more statute-oriented, Japanese
courts have relied heavily on the statutory requirement of creativity in
determining the copyrightability of literal aspects of computer software.
On this point, Japanese law contrasts with U.S. law, where in
"originality" is a de minimus standard, requiring merely that a work must be
an independent creation of author in order to be protected.153 Thus, the
"originality" requirement has been construed not to include positive
creativeness such as novelty or ingenuity.154 On the other hand, the
"1creativity" requirement under the Japanese copyright law functions as the
sole evaluative scale in determining the copyrightability of computer
software.155  The decisiveness of the creativity requirement has been
consistent since the Taito court held for the first time that a computer
program was copyrightable.
therefore did not meet the requirement of "program work." In so holding, the high court did not discuss
whether the IBF file fell within "programming language" or "algorithms" under Article 10(3) (Interview
with Professor Naoki Koizumi on Apr. 2, 1993).
153 See IL Rep. No. 94-1476, 51-52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659: "The phrase
'original works of authorship' which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change
the standard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does
not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the
standard of copyright protection to require them." (emphasis added).
154 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951),
("'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the
'author.'"); Atari Games. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1989), ("The level of creativity necessary
and sufficient for copyrightability has been described as 'very slight,' 'minimal, 'modest.").
But see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). In
Feist, the court denied the copyright of the telephone directory on the ground that it lacked minimum
originality ("17 U.S.C.§ 101 does not afford protection from copying to a collection of facts that are se-
lected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality.").
155 The importance of the creativity requirement under the Japanese copyright law is not only to the
computer software cases. Japanese courts have consistently evaluated the degree of the creativity of
alleged infringed work as a decisive factor in determining the infringement of subject matter of copyright
in general. See Takashi Yamamoto, infra note 156, 28-32. Shigeru Mild, The Scope of the Legal
Protectionfor Computer Software, 98 HOGAKu SHINPO 351,362-70 (in Japanese).
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However, the application of a single evaluative scale in determining
copyrightability does not mean that Japanese courts are simply drawing the
line between protectable and unprotectable elements without considering as
many factors as the U.S. courts do. Rather, as noted earlier, the Japanese
courts have evaluated various limiting factors to copyrightability in locating
the given work on a continuous creativity scale. For example, in System
Science the court discussed whether the literal aspects of the CA-7 II were
dictated by hardware constraints and common expression; the 1CM court
discussed the external factors that determined the literal expression of the
IBF file. If such limiting factors are present, the Japanese courts are likely
to conclude that the work does not satisfy the statutory requirement of
creativity.
At a glance, the Japanese courts thus set a high standard of copy-
rightability by requiring a work to be an independent creation of an author,
and also to have a substantial quantum of creativity. However, as seen in
U.S. cases discussed earlier, the U.S. courts denied the copyrightability of
an expression that met the "originality" requirement if it was dictated by
such external factors by virtue of copyright doctrines. In Japanese copyright
law, there are no independent doctrines or statutory provisions that
correspond to the merger, scene afaire and common expression doctrines in
the U.S. law. Instead, Japanese courts have developed these important
copyright law principles within the statutory requirement of creativity. 156
This requirement can ultimately serve the same policy of denying copyright
protection if protecting expressions would result in a monopoly of ideas.
In this sense, there seems to be no substantial difference between the
U.S. law and the Japanese law with respect to the "difficulty" of recognizing
the copyrightability of a literal expression. In Japanese case law, the same
analytic process as in the U.S. copyright doctrines are incorporated into the
analysis of the quantum of creativity under the Article 2(l)(i) of the
Japanese Copyright Act. System Science and ICM indicate that the Japanese
courts appear to be continuing this trend for the time being. In other words,
in spite of the difference in formality, both the U.S. and Japanese courts
156 Professor Karjala pointed out that the same result as System Science can be reached under
various U.S. copyright doctrines. Kardala, supra note 6, 245. For an excellent analysis of the relationship
between the Japanese creativity requirement and the U.S. merger doctrine in connection with System
Science, see Takashi Yamamoto, Chosakukenho niokeru "Sousakusei" no Gainen to Merge Riron (The
Concept of "Creativity" in Copyright Law and Merger Doctrine), 456 NBL 27 (1990) (in Japanese). In the
article, he also provides precedents in the Japanese copyright law which indicate that the Japanese courts
have consistently considered the same principle as the merger doctrine in the creativity requirement.
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require basically the same elements in order for a program to be found
copyrightable.
2. Second-Generation Issues
In contrast, with respect to the "second generation" issue of the protection
for non-literal aspects, the approach of the Japanese courts appears to be
significantly different from the U.S. approach. Because of the existence of
the specific provisions for exclusion from copyright unique to program
works, the Japanese courts have tended not to find non-literal aspects
copyrightable. However, the attitude of the Japanese courts toward
copyright protection for non-literal aspects still contains many uncertain
factors.
First, it should be noted that so far only two Japanese cases, System
Science and ICM, mentioned the issue of copyright protection for non-literal
aspects of software. These two cases exhibit conflicting understandings of
the statutory basis by which "processing flow," which seems equivalent to
what the U.S. courts call SSO, could not be copyrightable. In addition, the
courts in these cases were reviewing provisional relief and thus working
with limited factual records.
Second, and more importantly, the Japanese courts have yet to face
the sort of cases that propelled the U.S. courts to expand copyright
protection to non-literal aspects in order to effectuate justice in specific
cases, i.e., factual situations involving copying of visual aspects without
copying the literal code, or business relationships through which a free rider
obtains proprietary information. In addition, Japanese courts have yet to
address "valuable" non-literal aspects which could lead the courts to expand
the scope of copyright protection, as in Whelan, Broderbund, and Lotus.
The factual situations which the Japanese courts have encountered mostly
included verbatim copying of literal codes, or at best simple programs in
which the SSO was too primitive to be worthy of discussion as to whether it
should be protected.
This "hidden" but crucial disparity in the factual bases between the
U.S. and the Japanese cases results in an apparent difference in the scope of
copyright protection in the two countries. In the situations which the
Japanese courts have addressed, there has emerged no necessity to
reconsider the legitimacy and the scope of Article 10(3) with respect to the
protection of non-literal elements. The Japanese courts have yet to ask
themselves the fundamental question which the Whelan court faced when it
SLIMMR 1993
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went beyond protection of literal elements: which non-literal aspects of
software should be protected under copyright?
VI. CONCLUSION
Now that the general issue of the copyrightability of computer
software has been established by statute in both the U.S. and Japan, U.S. and
Japanese courts have recently been trying to establish the appropriate scope
of protection. Closely observing the cases in the U.S and Japan, one notices
interesting similarities in the application of legal tests to second generation
issues, even while there have been differences in the factual situations.
The Japanese court's reliance on a statutory requirement of creativity
appears to be significantly different from U.S. analyses, which extensively
discuss the applicability of various copyright doctrines. However, as
demonstrated above, this is a mere difference of legal formality. Because of
Japanese courts' general tendency to construct their analysis so as to be
faithful to the structure of the statute, they seem to rely on a single statutory
requirement. In reality, the statutory requirement of creativity under
Japanese copyright law functions as an evaluative scale that includes
virtually the same aspects of analysis as the copyright doctrines which the
U.S. courts consider in computer software cases.
With respect to the factual differences between the U.S. and Japanese
cases, the Japanese cases lacked the sort of equities that compelled the U.S.
courts to expand copyright protection to non-literal aspects. In addition to
being based on unique copyright law provisions that limit protection for
non-literal aspects, the Japanese holdings have been based on facts
involving verbatim copying of literal code or primitive SSO which has made
it unnecessary to discuss copyright protection for non-literal aspects of
programs. This characteristic of the Japanese cases may be partly due to the
fact that the Japanese domestic software industry for personal computers is
still under development. In addition, there is relatively less recognition
among Japanese of the value of computer software as opposed to hardware
in general. 157
The question then arises as to what will happen if a Japanese court in
the future faces the sort of situation which the U.S. courts have faced. Is
there no room for the Japanese courts to protect non-literal aspects as long
as the limitation of Article 10(3) exists? One possibility that the Japanese
157 MM admitted that the weakness of Japanese software industry compared with the hardware
industry is the current problem of Japanese computer industry. See NIHON KEIZM SHINBUN, Sep. 29, 1992.
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courts have yet to exploit is the copyrightability of "selection, arrangement,
and design of materials" as a compilation work, as established by the U.S.
courts in Softklone and CAMS with regard to elements of screen displays.
While none of the Japanese cases discussed above addressed this issue, the
Japanese Copyright Act explicitly states that a compilation work is
copyrightable as long as it meets the creativity requirement.158 Japanese
copyright case law at this point seems to favor the copyrightability of works
which demonstrate creativity in the arrangement and selection of
materials.159
Despite the existence of limiting provisions in the Japanese Copyright
Act and Japanese courts' relative lack of judicial creativeness, Japanese
courts are attentive to the equities in a given case. There is no apparent dif-
ference between the U.S. and the Japanese courts in this regard. If a
Japanese court were to face a case like Lotus, in which the non-literal
aspects of a program have significant value, or a case like Whelan or
Broderbund, where strong equity considerations play a role, how it would
respond is uncertain. This comparison of recent U.S. and Japanese cases
suggests that the expansion of protection experienced in the United States
has not yet come to Japan because of the absence of appropriate cases.
Thus, it may be just a matter of time before similar developments occur in
Japan.
158 Article 12 of the Japanese Copyright Act provides that: "A compilation work (except for a work
which falls within "database") which has creativity in selection or arrangement of materials shall be
protected as a work of authorship."
159 See Kardala & Sugiyama, supra note 99 nn.131-45 and accompanying text.
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